A Privacy Preserving Framework for RFID Based Healthcare Systems by Rahman, Farzana et al.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science
Faculty Research and Publications
Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science,
Department of
7-1-2017
A Privacy Preserving Framework for RFID Based
Healthcare Systems
Farzana Rahman
Marquette University, farzana.rahman@marquette.edu
Anwarul A. Bhuiyan
Marquette University
Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed
Marquette University, sheikh.ahamed@marquette.edu
Accepted version. Future Generation Computer Systems, Vol. 72 ( July 2017): 339-352. DOI. © 2017
Elsevier B.V. Used with permission.
 Marquette University 
e-Publications@Marquette 
 
Mathematics Faculty Research and Publications/College of Arts and 
Sciences 
 
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; but the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The 
published version may be accessed by following the link in the citation below. 
 
Future Generation Computer Systems, Vol. 72 (July 2017): 339-352. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not 
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the 
express permission from Elsevier.  
 
A Privacy Preserving Framework for RFID Based Healthcare 
Systems 
 
Farzana Rahman 
Department of Computer Science, James Madison University, VA 
Md Zakirul Alam Bhuiyan 
Department of Computer & Information Sciences, Temple University, PA 
Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed 
Department of Mathematics, Statistics & Computer Science, Marquette University, WI 
 
Keywords 
RFID, Privacy, Healthcare, Electronic Medical Record, Security 
Abstract 
RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) is anticipated to be a core technology that will be used in many 
practical applications of our life in near future. It has received considerable attention within the 
healthcare for almost a decade now. The technology’s promise to efficiently track hospital supplies, 
medical equipment, medications and patients is an attractive proposition to the healthcare industry. 
However, the prospect of wide spread use of RFID tags in the healthcare area has also triggered 
discussions regarding privacy, particularly because RFID data in transit may easily be intercepted and 
can be send to track its user (owner). In a nutshell, this technology has not really seen its true potential 
in healthcare industry since privacy concerns raised by the tag bearers are not properly addressed by 
existing identification techniques. There are two major types of privacy preservation techniques that 
are required in an RFID based healthcare system—(1) a privacy preserving authentication protocol is 
required while sensing RFID tags for different identification and monitoring purposes, and (2) a privacy 
preserving access control mechanism is required to restrict unauthorized access of private information 
while providing healthcare services using the tag ID. In this paper, we propose a framework (PriSens-
HSAC) that makes an effort to address the above mentioned two privacy issues. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first framework to provide increased privacy in RFID based healthcare systems, 
using RFID authentication along with access control technique. 
1. Introduction 
The Radio Frequency Identification technology (RFID) is growing so fast that few application sectors 
can beat that scorching rate of growth. RFID is a technology for automated identification with radio 
waves. It has three main parts: RFID tags, an RFID reader and a central server. RFID tags have an 
antenna and a tiny data chip for information storage and are commonly installed on objects or 
products that need to be identified. The content of the chip can be read/written with an RFID reader 
which is connected to the server  [1], [2]. 
Near field communication (NFC)  [3] is a similar technology like RFID with much less capability. NFC is a 
subset of RFID that limits the range of communication within 10 cm or 4 inches. However, one 
advantage of NFC is that some mobile phones are being equipped with NFC now a day. However, this 
advantage of NFC is overshadowed by its limitations, like NFC has a very limited range and it cannot be 
programmed like active RFID tags. Therefore, it cannot be used in applications where the reading range 
has to be in meters. It cannot be used in many sophisticated applications where the active tag has to 
be programmed for special purpose. Specially, in most of the healthcare applications (like: 
pharmaceutical drug tracking, patient specific meal dispatch and such sophisticated application) longer 
range and tag programming capability is required. Since RFID tags can be read in longer range and it 
can be programmed for special purpose, it has become popular over the last decade in many real life 
application areas including healthcare. 
RFID technology can provide a number of benefits to the healthcare industry, improving overall safety 
and operational efficiency because it operates without line-of-sight while providing immense 
capabilities. In fact, RFID can contribute to create the hospital of the future by improving patient care 
and safety, optimizing the workflows, reducing the operating costs, and reducing costly thefts. There 
are a number of ongoing trials and studies at hospitals and healthcare centers around the world 
utilizing and integrating RFID into their hospital information systems. One study estimates that the 
market for RFID tags in healthcare will rise rapidly from $90 million in 2006 to $2.1 billion in 2016. 
Primarily, this will be because of item level tagging of drugs and Real Time Locating Systems for staff, 
patients and assets to improve efficiency, safety and availability and to reduce losses  [4]. 
By attaching RFID tags to different entities in healthcare industry (people and objects), RFID technology 
can provide tremendous automation in identification, tracking, monitoring and security control 
measures. Some of the most promising RFID based systems that are already being successfully tested 
(or deployed) are patient identification and monitoring, patient’s drug usage monitoring, surgical 
instrument tracking and locating, newborn identification, hospital personnel identification and 
tracking, blood bag tracking, detecting pharmaceutical counterfeit, avoiding theft of medical 
equipment, tagging of meal plateaux to ensure patients get the appropriate diet, ensuring proper 
identification of laboratory specimens, restrict access to high threat areas of the hospital to authorized 
staff, etc. In a patient identification system of an RFID based hospital every patient is identified using 
an RFID tag installed wristband  [5]. A reader is used to identify the ID of the tag which allows the 
system to identify the patient uniquely. It also allows doctors, nurses and other hospital personnel to 
access the medical information of the legitimate patient from the server, using the tag ID. The ID can 
also be used to access various healthcare services, for example, identifying and dispatching prescribed 
medicine for a particular patient. 
In spite of several ongoing researches on RFID based healthcare systems  [6], [7], there are still some 
significant research challenges that need to be addresses. RFID tags generate vast quantities of 
information while used in healthcare services, but information systems and enterprises need to find 
ways to ingest, analyze, and archive that huge volume of data  [8]. These capabilities directly affect the 
major issues currently experienced by healthcare organizations while helping to drive down costs  [9]. 
There are many ways that big data methods could improve health outcomes. The more data that is 
aggregated about a given condition using RFID tags and sensors, the better researchers and clinicians 
might be able to trace what interventions have worked well and which have not been effective. 
Moreover, personalization algorithms could create ever more customized approaches for patient 
management. However, the big data collected over a period of time also allows scope for third party to 
perform security infringements and privacy violations. The inherent capability of precise and reliable 
identification attracts RFID systems in the area of tracking applications. This potentiality, however, can 
put individual privacy at a risk. A threat to consumer privacy is one of the major obstacles in the 
widespread deployment of RFID systems. A field trial of RFID embedded loyalty cards in Europe was 
canceled due to consumer protest over privacy concerns  [10]. Another legal law violation have been 
reported against RFID application tracking kids on school buses, even though the RFID chips were 
installed on the buses for better route navigation and communication purposes  [11]. The use of RFID 
chips in retail industry has been negatively reposted and protested recently all over North America  [12]. 
Additionally, plenty of healthcare applications using RFID chips are always facing controversy from 
consumer and government due to potential privacy leakage of its users  [13], [14]. Many tracking 
application used in E-Passports, consumer shopping, smart keys and such everyday applications have 
gone through strong opposition from users and policy makers since there are potential chances of 
privacy violation  [14]. Hence, security and privacy are the two most important issues that must be 
addressed before the enormous deployment of RFID tags in omnipresent environment. Our proposal in 
this paper offers a unique methodology to ensure more privacy for the big data collected from an RFID 
system. 
The security and privacy problems of RFID based applications become even more critical when it is 
used in healthcare environment which typically deals with sensitive human (patient) information. We 
have identified the following four major security and privacy related research challenges in RFID based 
healthcare systems. First, RFID tags can be read at a small distance, through materials, even without 
the knowledge of its owner. Second, if the communication between tags and readers is performed in 
wireless environment, any unauthorized reader may try to track the tag to access user’s private 
information. Third, data collected from RFID tags can potentially be used by multiple users (doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists etc.) and multiple organizations to provide various healthcare services. Fourth, the 
ID of the RFID tags along with its Electronic Medical Record (EMR), collected over a period of time, may 
expose significant private information of user such as: trace of personal health information, clinical 
history and financial information. In a nutshell, RFID technology has not really seen its true potential in 
healthcare since above mentioned four privacy concerns are not properly addressed by existing 
techniques. 
1.1. Our major contributions 
In this paper, we make an effort to address the above-mentioned four challenges with following 
contributions:  
• We point out two major privacy concerns in RFID based healthcare systems: privacy concerns in 
RFID sensing and privacy concerns in RFID based healthcare service access. 
• In this paper, we propose a framework (PriSens-HSAC), consisting of two major components 
that can address the above-mentioned two privacy issues respectively. 
• The PriSens component proposes a group based anonymous authentication protocol to solve 
the tradeoff between the scalability and privacy problem of RFID sensing in healthcare. This 
component provides more privacy and discloses less information than existing RFID 
authentication schemes. The novelty behind our idea is to preserve privacy in RFID sensing by 
introducing the notion that adversary cannot break unlinkability with probability better than 
random guessing. This component addresses the first two challenges mentioned before. 
PriSens component ensures that no sensitive information is disclosed to the adversary even if a 
tag’s information is read by an adversary, without the knowledge of its owner. 
• The HSAC component proposes a privacy preserving healthcare service access mechanism to 
maintain user’s privacy while accessing various healthcare services. This component uses P-
RBAC (see Section  7) based access control mechanism to allow access to sensitive information 
only to authorized users. This component addresses the last two challenges mentioned before. 
HSAC component ensures that the EMR associated with a specific RFID tags identifier is only 
accessible by authorized users, hence ensuring privacy of the RFID based information system 
used in the healthcare environment. 
• We also present the evaluation of the framework by measuring the level of the achieved 
privacy. Our evaluation clearly illustrates that our proposal provides better privacy in RFID 
based systems applied in a healthcare setting. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section  2 presents the motivation of our work. In 
Section  3, we present relevant related work. In Section  4, we discuss the privacy issues of RFID tag 
sensing in healthcare setting. In this section, we also discuss the privacy issues in RFID based 
healthcare service access. In Section  5, we present the architecture of our proposed framework. Then 
we present the group based anonymous authentication protocol (PriSens) in Section  6. In Section  7, 
we explain the working methodology of HSAC component in detail. The security and privacy analysis of 
PriSens protocol is presented in Section  8. In Section  9, we evaluate our framework by measuring the 
privacy level provided by PriSens protocol. In Section  10, we briefly discuss the benefits of using RFID 
in healthcare systems and our proposed framework. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section  11. 
2. Motivation 
2.1. RFID in healthcare 
There are certain fundamental properties of all RFID information systems that are particularly relevant 
to privacy, regardless of the specific application type or deployment scenario. RFID tags contain unique 
identifiers, indicating not only the presence of an object, like a product bar code, but also an 
individualized serial number. The ability to uniquely identify individual items has privacy implications 
when those items can be associated with people. RFID tag data can be read/written at a distance, 
without line-of-sight and through many camouflaging materials, potentially without the knowledge or 
consent of the individual who may be carrying the tag. RFID information systems can also capture time 
and location data, upon which item histories and profiles can be created, making accountability for 
data use critical. When such systems are applied to people, it may be viewed as surveillance. 
With the deployment and use of RFID technology in the healthcare domain, there are increasing 
privacy concerns regarding the technical designs of RFID systems. If RFID tags contain personal 
information, which could include health information, or data linked to personally identifiable 
individuals, without the proper security or integrity mechanisms in place, privacy interests become 
prominent. Personal health information is among the most sensitive types of information. As such, it 
requires stronger justifications for its collection, use and disclosure, rigorous protections against theft, 
loss and unauthorized use. 
While RFID technology can improve the overall quality of healthcare delivery, the benefits must be 
balanced with the privacy and security concerns. The use of RFID introduces a new set of risks: security 
risks are associated with the possible failure of the RFID system under various security attacks, 
i.e. tracking, eavesdropping, and denial of service, while the threat to privacy resides in the capabilities 
to permanently save and link information about individuals through temporal and spatial extension of 
data collection activities. Although concerns about information privacy are not unique to the 
healthcare domain, health related information can be perceived as more personal and more sensitive. 
Due to the highly personal and sensitive nature of healthcare data, both healthcare providers and 
patients can be expected to resist further digitalization though the usage of RFID technology until 
security and privacy protections is in place. Usually, RFID based sensing activities related to healthcare 
can be divided in two types: 
Direct sensing activity: These activities refer to various identification and monitoring systems. Some of 
the most promising RFID based direct sensing activity that are already being successfully tested (or 
deployed) in a number of hospitals are: hospital personnel  [5], patient and newborn identification and 
monitoring  [5], patient’s drug usage monitoring  [15], surgical instrument tracking and locating  [16], and 
blood bag tracking  [15]. 
Indirect inferred activity: These activities use direct sensing activity data to infer important 
information. For example, detecting pharmaceutical counterfeit, avoiding theft of medical equipment, 
the tagging of meal plateaux to ensure that patients get proper diet according to their treatment, 
allergies and tastes etc. 
Fig. 1 illustrates a simple architecture of an RFID system in healthcare. It has two individual modules: 
(1) RFID Sensing Module—consisting of all the RFID identification and monitoring systems. (2) Service 
Provider Module—consisting of all the systems that use legitimate RFID identification data to provide 
various healthcare services (ex. physician’s diagnosis, prescription, medicine usage chart, specialist’s 
opinion, insurance verification, appropriate medicine dispatch, etc.). Some simple example scenario of 
RFID tag usage in healthcare area can be as follows: 
 
Fig. 1. An RFID based ubiquitous healthcare system. 
Medicines’ authenticity tracking: Ensuring the origin of medicines is essential to guarantee their 
quality. RFID tag based identification and authentication methods can guarantee the origin of 
medicines, especially in pharmaceutical supply chains. Electronic Product Codes (EPC) (e.g. a serial 
number) in RFID tags are used to track each individual medicine along the supply chain. Each EPC/RFID 
tag is attached to a drug unit. Thus, it is possible to track every individual drug unit and to verify its 
authenticity. An attacker can exploit this tracking mechanism to lead to potential privacy violation of 
the drug user. 
Patients’ drug dispatch: Usually, in case RFID based hospitals, a patient is identified using RFID installed 
wristband  [5]. The medical information of the legitimate patient is then pulled up from the central 
database and passed onto the physician’s PDA which is a part of the service provider module. The 
physician’s system may suggest medicine based on diagnosis and the pharmacy system may use the 
prescription to dispatch proper medicine for the patient. An attacker can exploit the information 
system of the pharmacy to lead to potential privacy violation of its user. 
Financial transactions: Depending on the health care system, patients must pay for the service that 
they receive. In addition, health care providers must be able to verify that a given patient is covered 
under a particular plan, what specific procedures, lab tests, and whether dependents are covered. In 
this case, RFID can be used to identify patients using wristbands  [5] which can pull up all those 
information in seconds for hospital bill calculation. Any attacker can use their own reader to 
impersonate as a legitimate reader and can read patient’s wristbands to gain further access to patent’s 
personal information. 
Patients’ disease monitoring: Wide varieties of methods have been used to identify patients when they 
are in hospitals. One of the most popular methods is based on using a wristband in which a bar code is 
printed. However, recently the barcode based bracelets have been replaced by RFID tag based 
bracelets  [5]. In some chronic diseases, continuous monitoring of patients is very important. RFID 
technology could be used to send information from patients to a control system. The control system 
could activate an alarm based on the received data. 
2.2. Two fold privacy preservation 
RFID has received considerable attention within the healthcare since early 2000. The technology’s 
promise to efficiently track hospital supplies, medical equipment, medications and patients is an 
attractive proposition to the healthcare industry. However, the prospect of wide spread use of RFID in 
the healthcare area has also triggered discussions regarding privacy. Some major research challenges 
related to the development and deployment of RFID based healthcare are as follows:  
• RFID tags can be read at a small distance. If the communication between tags and readers is 
performed in wireless channel, adversary may try to infer personal information to track people 
remotely. 
• Deployed ubiquitous healthcare systems may have both access permission and privacy invasion 
problems for the patient’s individual medical data that may be overheard by unauthorized 
persons trying to access the system stealthily. 
• The information sensed using RFID tags may need to be shared with various authorities to 
access healthcare services. The ID of the tag along with its EMR, collected over a period of time, 
may expose user’s private information. 
It is evident that in RFID based healthcare systems, the privacy concerns are twofold and we need to 
have twofold privacy management mechanism in place: (1) A privacy preserving authentication 
protocol is required while sensing RFID tags. This protocol will preserve privacy when different 
identification and monitoring process are executed in “RFID sensing module” of   Fig. 1, (2) A privacy 
preserving access control technique is required while receiving services from “service provider module” 
of   Fig. 1   to ensure user preferred privacy level is achieved. 
With this privacy mechanism in place, the true potential of an RFID based healthcare system can finally 
be exploited. The widespread adoption of such privacy preserving RFID based healthcare system will 
open doors for various assisted care, remote health monitoring, and elderly care systems. Eventually, it 
will help to ensure quality healthcare facilities, longer life expectancy, reduced death rate, and 
preserve patient’s privacy. 
3. Related work 
The HSAC component of the PriSens-HSAC framework uses P-RBAC  [17] as part of the HSAC component. 
There are plenty of role based access control techniques in the literature. In  [18], the authors propose 
an enhanced role based access control mechanism for hospital information systems. However, the 
authors did not consider privacy issues. Purpose based access control (PBAC) models also have been 
proposed to protect sensitive data  [19], [20], but the purpose is difficult to define. Jin et al. propose a 
framework for e-Health systems  [21], which supports patient-centric selective sharing of virtual 
composite e-Health data using different levels of granularity. However, it focuses on the framework 
only and does not discuss a detailed approach for policy definition and management. Attribute based 
access control (ABAC) adopts XACML  [22] to define policies, and transform them into access control lists 
(ACLs). However, commercial DBMS kernel cannot support XACML and thus existing ABAC module in 
databases is implemented in and on the fly basis. This brings high performance degradation for the 
database. 
The major component of PriSesn-HSAC framework is PriSens which is an RFID authentication protocol. 
Several authentication protocols have been proposed to secure RFID systems against major attacks. 
RFID security based research area can be divided into two categories. The first category is protocol 
based. This category mainly focuses on implementing protocols using secure, lightweight primitives on 
small RFID tags in order to ensure security and privacy. The second category is hardware based and this 
category focuses on improving RFID tag hardware so that it can provide additional security primitives. 
Our focus is on the first category. So we will not discuss about the hardware based category. However, 
interested readers can refer to  [1], [23] for more details. 
Within the area of the protocol based on category numbers of techniques have been proposed for 
ensuring RFID security and the assortment of authentication protocols is quite extensive. Back-end 
database played an essential role in most early works on RFID security. Researchers came up with 
highly secure protocols but authentication was done mostly by the back-end server rather than the 
reader itself. 
Weis et al.  [24] proposed authentication protocol which used back-end database to perform the 
authentication. Under this scheme, an RFID tag replies with a different value each time it is queried by 
a reader as each reply of the tag involves a random number. This protocol is more suitable when an 
RFID system wants to provide strong security. However, this protocol is not very convincing for 
providing strong privacy of RFID tag bearers. 
Another lightweight protocol is OSK  [25]. Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita proposed that two hash 
function 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐺𝐺 are sufficient to provide indistinguishability and forward secrecy. Here, 𝐻𝐻 is a one 
way hash function and 𝐺𝐺 has random oracle. According to this protocol, a tag is initialized with a 
shared secret and the back-end server maintains a list of tags (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖). The tag updates its secret key 
after each query according to the following formula 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖). And in response to the query from a 
reader, the tag replies 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖). The server on the other hand uses 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 to identify the tag by 
performing a brute force search through the list of tags. OSK does not ensure scalability. 
In  [26], Avoine and Oechslin modified OSK which removed the scalability problem. They introduced a 
time–memory trade off which reduced the computational complexity for inverting the hash function. 
But this feature was achieved at the cost of increased memory. 
Another problem of OSK is that a malicious reader may easily desynchronize a tag which eventually 
results in DOS attack. Another hash function based authentication protocol was proposed by Seo 
et al.  [27] which ensures scalability. This protocol is also untraceable. The most significant contribution 
of this paper is scalability and forward secrecy. One of the main drawbacks of this protocol is that 
ownership transfer requires external intervention. 
Seo et al. proposed another authentication protocol  [28] that ensures high scalability and ownership 
transfer. It is a lightweight authentication protocol that employs a proxy in addition to the back-end 
server. The protocol is based on Universal Re-encryption which allows the back-end server to get the 
tag identifier only after a simple decryption. This decryption requires a constant time which makes it 
one of the highest scalable authentication protocol. But its application area is restricted because of the 
use of proxy. This protocol is best suited for personal use. But it suffers from the problem of 
traceability and some other security issues such as DOS attack and swapping. 
YA-TRAP  [29] is a famous authentication protocol that places little burden on the back-end server. The 
principle advantage of this protocol is that the central database avoids any real time processing. 
Authors proposed that YA-TRAP is really advantageous in situations where tag information is processed 
in batches rather than in real time. The fundamental idea of this protocol is based on monotonically 
increasing timestamp which makes this protocol secured against tracking. But the use of the 
timestamp makes this protocol unsecured against DOS attack. In this protocol, an RFID tag update its 
timestamp based on a value provided by the reader. At the same time each tag stores 𝑇𝑇max, where 
𝑇𝑇max is the maximum value that can be reached by the timestamp. When the timestamp reaches 𝑇𝑇max 
a tag does not answer to the reader’s queries. Hence an adversary can send the tag a large enough 
timestamp so that it goes beyond 𝑇𝑇max. Thus it becomes quite easy for a malicious reader to create 
DOS attack. Although the solution to DOS was proposed in Y A-TRAP + [30], this protocol still lacks 
forward secrecy. 
In  [31], Hoque et al. proposed a serverless authentication protocol for RFID system. But their system is 
also more focused on defending various attacks without the help of central database. Moreover, in 
their system, the reader has to do a lot of computation to find out  
of the required tag. In  [32], the authors proposed an RFID authentication protocol that supports not 
only security and privacy, but also recovery in RFID systems. The protocol can get back the 
desynchronized tags and readers to their normal state, and thus provides robustness. The focus of this 
system was to defend against various attacks, rather than provide better privacy for the RFID tag 
owners. 
In  [33], Hoque et al. proposed a privacy preserving RFID authentication protocol. However, this protocol 
is not entirely suitable for RFID based healthcare systems, since it does not address the unique privacy 
requirements of RFID based healthcare systems, where the tag owner’s privacy needs to be enhanced. 
Private authentication techniques proposed to protect user privacy in RFID systems can be classified 
into two categories, non-tree-based approaches and tree-based approaches. Non-tree-based protocols 
usually perform linear search, 𝑂𝑂(𝑁𝑁), to find out a tag. But, the linear search is not efficient for systems 
with huge number of tags. Another non-tree-based approach, Hash-lock  [24] method uses the hash 
value of a key to identify a tag. Molnar and Wagner proposed a tree based approach in  [34] that 
reduces the complexity of authentication from 𝑂𝑂(𝑁𝑁) to 𝑂𝑂(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁). 
Numbers of research have been conducted to find out a trade-off between the complexity and the 
level of privacy provided by the key-tree based scheme. This trade-off is identified and analyzed by 
Avoine et al. in  [35], by Buttyan, Holczer, and Vajda in  [36], and more recently by Nohl and Evans in  [37]. 
These papers quantify the level of privacy provided by the key-tree based scheme when some tags are 
compromised. Avoine et al. proposed a group based private authentication scheme in  [38] that 
improves the tradeoff between scalability and privacy. But the privacy level decreases as more and 
more tags are compromised. Another authentication technique proposed by Zhou in  [39] focuses on 
utilizing fewer resources on the tags for authentication. However, even though they we able to achieve 
more security and efficiency, their proposed approach did not focus on providing privacy for the users. 
HB-family protocols based on LPN assumption are also booming as one of the attractive candidates for 
secure low cost protocols based on EPC tags  [40] due to its security against quantum adversaries, 
efficient computational time and memory requirement etc. However, their focus was to design a 
secure authentication protocol to meet the demand of low-cost tags. A summary of most of the major 
protocols are shown in Table 1. 
  
Table 1. Comparison of existing techniques. 
 
Our proposed PriSens-HSAC framework provides higher level of privacy and security, both in terms of 
RFID sensing and EMR accessing. The framework provides more privacy in RFID based healthcare 
system by proposing a better privacy preserving authentication protocol and by using P-RBAC while 
accessing healthcare services. To the best of our knowledge, PriSens-HSAC is the first framework to 
provide increased privacy in RFID based healthcare systems through the usage of RFID authentication 
along with access control technique. Though our major motivation in these paper is to enhance the 
privacy of users in an RFID based healthcare system, our proposed PriSens-HSAC framework addresses 
all of the security requirements too. PriSens-HSAC framework has scope not only in healthcare 
industry, but also in other applications where privacy of tag bearers is an important issue. 
4. Privacy concerns in RFID systems 
4.1. Privacy issues in RFID sensing 
Ensuring strong privacy in RFID sensing imposes a higher complexity on the reader. Conversely, 
improving efficiency may hamper some privacy. Here, our main focus is on the tradeoff between 
privacy and scalability of RFID systems. 
Molnar and Wagner  [34] first proposed a tree based hash protocol for RFID systems to reduce the 
search complexity of the reader from 𝑂𝑂(𝑁𝑁) to 𝑂𝑂(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁), where 𝛼𝛼 is the branching factor at each level 
of the tree. But this approach achieves better scalability at the cost of some privacy loss of the tags  [37]. 
Fig. 2(a) shows a balanced key tree with 𝑁𝑁 = 8 and 𝛼𝛼 = 2. Suppose the tag 𝑇𝑇3 in Fig. 2(a) becomes 
compromised. All the tags of the system are partitioned into three disjoint sets. The adversary can now 
uniquely distinguish the tag 𝑇𝑇4 and identify the tags 𝑇𝑇1 and 𝑇𝑇2 as a unique partition. All the remaining 
tags (𝑇𝑇5,𝑇𝑇6,𝑇𝑇7,𝑇𝑇8) form a single partition because the tag shares no key with them. Therefore each tag 
of this partition (𝑇𝑇5,𝑇𝑇6,𝑇𝑇7,𝑇𝑇8) is anonymous among these four tags. The privacy provided by this 
scheme diminishes as more and more tags are compromised. 
 
Fig. 2(a). (a) Tree based hash protocol with 𝑁𝑁 = 8 and 𝛼𝛼 = 2. 
 
Fig. 2(b). (b) Group based protocol, with 𝑁𝑁 = 8 and 𝛾𝛾 = 4. 
Fig. 2. Two privacy preserving RFID authentication protocols. 
Avoine et al.  [38] proposed a group based authentication protocol to address the privacy problem of the 
tree based hash protocol. According to this protocol, tags are divided into 𝛾𝛾 disjoint groups of equal 
size. Fig. 2(b) shows the group organization of the tags where 𝑁𝑁 = 8 and 𝛾𝛾 = 4. This protocol reduces 
the complexity of both the reader and the tag. The tag always has to perform two encryptions. In the 
worst case, the reader has to perform 𝛾𝛾 + 1 encryptions. In addition, each tag needs to store only two 
keys for the authentication. The group organization of this protocol improves the level of privacy. For 
instance, if the tag 𝑇𝑇3 is compromised, the adversary can uniquely identify only the tag 𝑇𝑇4 (see 
Fig. 2(b)). The adversary cannot uniquely distinguish the other tags 𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2,𝑇𝑇5,𝑇𝑇6,𝑇𝑇7,𝑇𝑇8. Each of these 
tags remains anonymous among these six tags. Like other protocols, this protocol also has some 
limitations. There is a tradeoff between the number of groups and the group size. To address this 
problem, we propose an efficient anonymous private authentication (PriSens) scheme that allows the 
tags to have more privacy (i.e. less information disclosure) by keeping the reader’s complexity within a 
practical range. However, PriSens is much better than the other schemes, in terms of providing more 
privacy, where the worst case reader’s complexity is 𝑂𝑂(𝑁𝑁) (where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of total tags in the 
system). To provide improvement in privacy preservation, PriSens incurs small increase in the 
complexity of the reader. Since readers are more powerful than the tags, they can handle this increase 
in search complexity. Therefore, this protocol is specifically suitable for healthcare since its main goal is 
to achieve scalable automation as well as preserve privacy. 
4.2. Privacy issues in RFID based healthcare service access 
The ID of the RFID tag identified by PriSens, may need to be shared with physicians, pharmacy, 
insurance company and emergency care providers to access various healthcare services. This 
information, collected over a period, may expose significant private information such as trace of 
personal location, health information etc. To address this, we propose a privacy preserving access 
control technique to restrict unauthorized access of patient’s private information. 
5. Architecture of PriSens-HSAC framework 
To solve the two major privacy issues in RFID based healthcare systems, we propose PriSens-HSAC, a 
framework consisting of two major components. One component is PriSens that proposes a group 
based anonymous authentication protocol to solve the tradeoff between the scalability and privacy of 
RFID sensing in healthcare. PriSens provides more privacy with efficiency than existing RFID 
authentication protocols. We discuss the details of PriSens in Section  6. The second component is 
HSAC that proposes a privacy preserving healthcare service access mechanism to maintain user’s 
privacy while accessing various healthcare services. HSAC follows the concept of role based access 
control mechanism to restrict unauthorized access to private data. We discuss the details of HSAC 
component in Section  7. The architecture of the framework is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Architecture of PriSens-HSAC framework. 
When any RFID based identification or monitoring operation takes place in a healthcare system, the 
reader as well as tags in concern executes PriSens protocol to preserve user privacy. It is important to 
notice that PriSens can preserve privacy and defend against attacks launched by the outsider 
adversary. For example, if any unauthorized reader tries to launch any attack in the RFID information 
system of the hospital or tries to violate user privacy (by tracking the user), PriSens can defend against 
the launched attacks and provide better privacy compared to the other existing protocols  [34], [38]. If any 
unauthorized user wants to access any healthcare service (ex. access patient’s medical history using 
the ID of the tag), HSAC will not allow the user to access that service using a privacy aware role based 
access control mechanism  [17]. Therefore, it is evident that PriSens component will run in tags and 
reader. Nevertheless, HSAC component can be executed in user’s mobile devices, central server or any 
other machines that uses ID if the RFID tag to access healthcare related services. 
6. Overview of PriSens protocol 
In this sub-section, we will describe the details of PriSens (Group based Anonymous Authentication 
Protocol for RFID Sensing) Protocol. 
6.1. Privacy characterization in PriSens 
In literature, several different notions of privacy have been proposed so far. Some authors mention 
information privacy as the privacy of RFID systems. This privacy notion is the act of preventing a tag 
from disclosing its product information  [25], [24]. But protecting information privacy keeps tags 
traceable. Therefore, it is a weak notion of RFID privacy. Some define unlinkability as the strong notion 
of RFID privacy  [37], [43]. Unlinkability means the inability to distinguish between the responses from the 
same tag and the responses from different tags of the system. Providing unlinkability ensures strong 
privacy when the adversary cannot distinguish between two tags with a probability better than 
random guessing  [2]. In our protocol, we protect privacy of the tags by providing unlinkability between 
two tags of the system. 
The level of privacy obtained by any protocol can be measured using the anonymity set. Anonymity has 
been proposed in the context of mix-nets in  [44]. Mix-nets are used to make the sender (and the 
recipient) of a message anonymous. The anonymity set is defined as the set of all potential senders 
(recipients) of the message. Anonymity is defined as being not identifiable among a group of entities, 
i.e., the members of the anonymity set. A higher degree of anonymity is achieved with an anonymity 
set of larger size. Perfect anonymity is achieved if anonymity set contains all the members capable of 
sending (receiving) messages in system. 
6.1.1. System model of PriSens 
In our protocol, tags are divided into groups of equal size. Suppose, 𝑁𝑁 is the total number of tags in the 
system and 𝜏𝜏 is the number of groups. So, the group size is 𝑛𝑛 = 𝑁𝑁
𝜏𝜏
. Next, we define the components and 
parameters of our system. 
Issuer. The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment by writing the tag’s information into its 
memory. The issuer also authorizes the reader access to the tags. Even each group receives its unique 
group key and a pool of identifiers from the issuer. 
Group. Each group has a 𝑛𝑛 number of tags. The issuer assigns a unique group key 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  to the 𝑖𝑖th group 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 of the system. This key is shared between the members (tags) of this group. Each group also 
receives the following pool of identifiers from the issuer 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 = {ID𝑖𝑖,1, ID𝑖𝑖,2, … , ID𝑖𝑖,𝑀𝑀} where, 1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝜏 
and 𝑀𝑀 is a system parameter. The pools of any two groups do not share any identifier, i.e., 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗 =
0̸,∀𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗. Each tag of the group 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is assigned a couple of identifiers from 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 by the issuer. 
Tag. All the tags of the system are divided into 𝜏𝜏 groups. Each tag receives the shared group key of the 
group that the tag belongs to, a unique secret key that is known only to the reader and the tag itself, 
and a set of identifiers from the pool of identifiers of the group. Suppose, the tag 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 belongs to the 
group 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖. This tag possesses the group key 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖, the unique secret key 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖, and a set of identifiers 𝛺𝛺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. 
Each key is of 𝜃𝜃 bits, where 𝜃𝜃 is the security parameter of symmetric key encryption. We define the 𝛺𝛺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
as follows  
𝛺𝛺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = {ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗1 , ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗2 , … , ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚},where , 
• each ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥  is chosen randomly following uniform distribution from the pool 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥 ∈{1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀}, where 1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑚𝑚 
• ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥 ≠ ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑦𝑦, for all 𝑥𝑥 ≠ 𝑦𝑦 
• 𝑚𝑚 is also a system parameter and 𝑀𝑀 > 𝑚𝑚. 
The identifiers are assigned to the tags in such a way that at least one identifier of a tag is shared with 
at least two other members of the same group. So, we can say for the tag 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,  
∃𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞�ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥 ∈ �𝛺𝛺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝛺𝛺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖��, 
Where 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞 are any two members of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑝 ≠ 𝑞𝑞. 
Reader. The reader is connected to the backend server. We assume the communication channel 
between the reader and the backend server is secured. From now on, we denote the backend server as 
the reader. In our system, the tag is the prover and the reader is the verifier. The reader receives all 
the secret information by the issuer during the deployment. The issuer issues the reader a set of secret 
information for each group in the system 𝜓𝜓 = {〈𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖〉 ∣ 1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝜏}, where 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  is the secret group 
key and 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 is the mapping of the identifiers of the pool with the secret keys of tags. Formally,  
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 = {〈ID𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥,𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥〉 ∣ 1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑀𝑀andID𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖}, 
where is the set of secret keys of tags associated with the ID𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥 can be defined as an empty set if no tag 
is associated with the ID𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥 or it can be a set of size at least one. Formally,  
𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥 = {{𝑘𝑘𝜔𝜔1 ,𝑘𝑘𝜔𝜔2 , … }, where𝜔𝜔∗ ∈ {𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2, … ,𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁}0̸, otherwise .  
System parameters. Since each tag receives 𝑚𝑚 identifiers randomly chosen from the pool of 𝑀𝑀 
identifiers, according to the ID distribution strategy, we can say that each tag has at least one identifier 
common with at least two group members. The probability that each tag shares at least one identifier 
with at least two group members is  
𝑃𝑃share = 1 − ((𝑀𝑀−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 )(𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚) × (
𝑀𝑀− 2𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚 )(𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚) ) = 1 − ((𝑀𝑀−𝑚𝑚)!)3(𝑀𝑀!)2(𝑀𝑀− 3𝑚𝑚)! 
where 𝑀𝑀 ≥ 𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚. For example, we consider an RFID system of 1000 tags divided in 10 groups. 100 tags 
are in each group. For simplicity, we assume 𝑀𝑀 = 100 and 𝑚𝑚 = 10. Then the probability that each tag 
shares at least one identifier with at least two group members is 𝑃𝑃share = 96.87%. 
Note, in our system, 𝑀𝑀 is a system parameter which basically refers to the number of identifiers 
assigned to a particular group. And 𝑚𝑚 refers to the number of identifiers assigned to each tag. The 
more identifiers are assigned, that is the more the value of M, the harder it is for the adversary to 
break privacy. However, we cannot make 𝑀𝑀 such a very large number so that the system becomes 
slow. There has to be a tradeoff between the two and system designer needs to make a decision of 
choosing 𝑀𝑀 based on the requirement of system’s performance and privacy need. 
6.1.2. Brief overview of PriSens 
In this subsection, we describe our protocol. In PriSens, in order to authenticate a tag, the reader sends 
a single challenge to the tag. The answer of the tag has two parts. In the first part, the tag answers to 
the reader by encrypting with the group key the reader’s challenge concatenated with a nonce picked 
by the tag, and the tag’s identifier (chosen from the pool of IDs). In the second part, the tag encrypts 
the challenge concatenated with the nonce using its own secret key. Encrypting the identifier is needed 
since the key used for encryption does not identify uniquely the tag. Upon reception of the answer, the 
reader identifies the tag by trying all the group keys until the decryption succeeds. Once the reader 
finds out the tag ID, then it checks the second part. The reader tries all secret keys associated with the 
identifier to decrypt the second part of the message. Without the second part, every tag could 
impersonate every other tag in the same group. Fig. 4 shows how PriSens works. 
 Fig. 4. The PriSens protocol. 
The reader starts to query the tag with a nonce 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟. Upon the reception of the query, the tag generates 
another nonce 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡. Suppose the reader interrogates the tag 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗. In the second step, the tag picks an 
identifier, say ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥, from 𝛺𝛺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. Then the tag computes as shown in Fig. 4. Here, 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘(. ) denotes 
symmetric key encryption with key 𝑘𝑘. The tag replies with the 𝛽𝛽. Now the reader searches all the group 
keys until it finds the correct one that properly decrypts the first part (𝑢𝑢) of the response. If the reader 
retrieves the identifier ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥  that the tag used in its response, then the reader tries to decrypt the 
second part (𝑣𝑣) of 𝛽𝛽 with the potential set of secret keys (𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥) associated with ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥. After finding the 
right secret key, the reader can uniquely identify the tag 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗. Sharing some identifiers of a tag with other 
members of the group provides unlinkability even if any tag is compromised by the adversary. 
Search complexity of PriSens 
According to PriSens, the reader’s complexity is slightly increased than the group based scheme  [34]. 
After receiving the response 𝛽𝛽 = (𝑢𝑢𝑣𝑣) from a tag 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗, the reader searches for the correct group key to 
decrypt 𝑢𝑢. In the worst case, the reader has to perform this operation 𝜏𝜏 times. If such a group key 
exists, the reader can retrieve the identifier ID𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥  from 𝑢𝑢. Now, the reader has to search for the tag’s 
secret key to identify 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 by decrypting 𝑣𝑣 properly. The reader searches a key space of size |𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥|. 
Therefore, in the worst case, the reader’s total complexity is 𝜏𝜏 + |𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥|. In the best case, the size of 𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥 is 
3 and in the worst case, it can be 𝑛𝑛, size of the group. But in the group based scheme, the reader’s 
complexity in worst case is 𝑁𝑁. Nevertheless, PriSens is much better than the other schemes where the 
worst case reader’s complexity is 𝜏𝜏 + 1, the number of total tags in the system. To provide 
improvement in privacy protection, we have to sacrifice this small increase in the complexity of the 
reader. Since readers are more powerful than tags, they can handle this increase in search complexity. 
Memory complexity of PriSens 
According to PriSens, tags need to store 𝑚𝑚 number of identifiers along with the group key and the 
unique secret key. Though tags have limited resources, however, the increase in memory requirement 
is acceptable than the increase in computation and communication complexity. A smart RFID tags have 
memory capacity of 32 kB or more. Even RFID tags with extended memory capacity are available at the 
market. All these tags can store the information required for PriSens. 
7. Overview of HSAC framework 
In this section, we describe the details of HSAC (Privacy Preserving Healthcare Service Access 
Mechanism) framework. Unauthorized disclosure of health related information can have serious 
consequences like: refusal of employment, seclusion from family or community groups and personal 
embarrassment. Once information has been disclosed, the damage cannot be undone so to earn user 
trust it is important that unauthorized disclosure is prevented. Also to prevent any kind of insider 
attack in the RFID based hospital information system, unauthorized access of sensitive data should be 
prevented. A major concern in RFID based healthcare system is how to protect user privacy when the 
RFID identification data, i.e. patient’s private information are increasingly passed around and accessed 
by a large number of people such as doctors, nurses, technicians, and researchers. This information, 
collected over a period, may expose significant private information such as: trace of personal location, 
medical history, treatment history, and even financial information. One measure is to use access 
control technique, which requires that only authorized entities or users with a legitimate request 
satisfying related policies or laws can access sensitive information. 
7.1. Access policy requirements for healthcare privacy 
In modern day healthcare systems, most of the organizations are internetworking their systems, 
increasing the potential for unauthorized access. Since there are countless individual scenarios, 
circumstances and relationships, the access control framework must be flexible and highly expressive. 
The framework needs to ensure that a user’s access policy can be recorded and enforced in a manner 
that reflects their understanding of who they want to have access and who they do not want to have 
access. This will typically involve allowing or disallowing consent to groups or roles. In order to restrict 
access of certain information to only certain people, allowing or disallowing access to certain roles 
needs to be included too. To employ allowance and disallowance of consent or access rights explicit 
denial of access to particular role is necessary. 
The electronic medical record (EMR) in modern day healthcare information systems allows healthcare 
sectors to provide anytime–anywhere access to patient’s info and overall medical history, thereby 
increasing efficiency and improving patient care. Yet this ubiquitous transaction presents significant 
privacy risks. Hence, someone need to implement access control as part of these services to ensure 
that the right people get the right information at the right time. However, doing such a critical job 
manually for every single patient is simple impossible and hence information management systems 
used in healthcare system use some kind of technique to automate the process using access control 
mechanism. The need for RBAC stems from the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s minimum necessary provisions. 
Most health care services (HCOs) need to implement fine-grained authorization protocols, since their 
users must be granted specific access privileges that define actions they may perform. In meeting the 
HIPAA Security standard for access control, many healthcare sectors are combining rule and policy-
based access control with role-based access control, which provides efficiency and helps meet the 
HIPAA Privacy requirements. 
7.2. Brief overview of HSAC 
Role based access control (RBAC)  [45] is a popular security model. Due to its flexibility, RBAC model has 
been widely applied to healthcare information systems  [46], [47]. The RBAC model that NIST has 
proposed for standardization does not support explicit denial except in a limited way by using 
constraints  [38]. In this paper, we propose HSAC, a privacy preserving healthcare service access 
mechanism. The architecture of HSAC is shown in Fig. 5. HSAC proposes to preserve user preferred 
privacy while accessing healthcare services using Privacy-aware Role Based Access Control (P-
RBAC)  [17]. The adoption of a model like P-RBAC in a RFID based healthcare seems justifiable since 
healthcare is a complex environment that deals with various user roles in multiple organizations. 
Classical RBAC, does not support role roaming among different organizations. Furthermore, in order to 
protect privacy in healthcare sector, not only the content of EMR but also some meta information 
about EMRs, e.g., the creators, owners are required for privacy protection. However, the main feature 
of P-RBAC lies in the complex structure of privacy permissions that reflects a structured ways of 
expressing privacy rules. Aside from the data and the action to be performed on the data, in P-RBAC, 
privacy permission explicitly states the intended purpose of the action along with the conditions under 
which the permission can be granted and the obligations that are to be finally performed. It helps in 
verifying that the access control policies of the healthcare organization are compliant with privacy 
regulations. Moreover, in HSAC, we allow users to have preferred privacy configuration by including 
user defined privacy policies along with the organizational privacy policies. 
 
Fig. 5. The architecture of HSAC. 
In HSAC, the administrator can define and manage traditional privacy policies related to the access of 
various data as well as user preferred privacy policies. For example, some doctor may not want anyone 
else to view her patient’s medical diagnosis without her permission. The Privacy Policy Manager (PPM) 
breaks down all these policies into unit privacy policy and unit user role. The unit policy and unit role 
are stored in Privacy Policy DB (Database) and User Role DB (Database). The User Role DB module also 
contains a role hierarchy. For example, any information that can be viewed by the nurse must be 
accessible by the doctor too. Only a part of information visible to nurse may be accessible by the 
pharmacist, who only needs to know which drug to dispatch for which patient. Moreover, the 
pathologist only needs to know the lab test name, and the accounts section of the hospital needs to 
know the breakdown of costs for various services provided to the patient. It is hard to develop a 
generalized role hierarchy since it may differ for different institutions. However, such a role hierarchy 
can be defined by the administrator based on the preference and organization requirements. 
Whenever, a user requests for some healthcare service using the ID of the tag, the Access Control 
Manager (ACM) locates policies defined by the PPM. The PPM then brings up the requested 
information by querying stored unit policies and merging them for the particular user role. If ACM 
detects any violation of any unit privacy rule for a particular role, the service request is denied. 
8. Security and privacy analysis 
In this section, we formally prove that our protocol preserves data privacy and provides unlinkability. In 
addition, we analyze the preservation of privacy in some attack scenarios where some of the tags of 
the system are compromised by the adversary ?ˆ?𝐴. 
8.1. Information privacy 
Theorem 1 
PriSens  preserves information privacy with respect to the adversary Aˆ. 
Proof 
Let us assume 𝒪𝒪pick provides the adversary ?ˆ?𝐴 with a tag 𝑇𝑇. ?ˆ?𝐴 transmits this tag to the oracle ?ˆ?𝐴 with a 
nonce 𝑛𝑛1. Then 𝒪𝒪encrypt provides ?ˆ?𝐴 with the response 𝛽𝛽. 
Now, ?ˆ?𝐴 selects a ID. To break data privacy ?ˆ?𝐴, should tell if 𝛽𝛽 is produced using the ID. This implies that 
?ˆ?𝐴 has to identify the input of the encryption by just learning the cipher text. ?ˆ?𝐴 can succeed in two 
cases. First, if she can retrieve the inputs from the output of the random oracle. But this contradicts 
with our assumption that the inputs of a random oracle are computationally intractable from the 
output of the oracle. Second, if ?ˆ?𝐴 knows the secret keys of the tag 𝑇𝑇. Without tampering the tag 𝑇𝑇, if ?ˆ?𝐴 
can determine the keys by learning the cipher texts, this again breaks the semantic security of the 
symmetric key cryptography. Therefore ?ˆ?𝐴 can break data privacy with probability no better than 
random guessing. Thus it proves data privacy property of Definition 1. ■ 
8.2. Unlinkability 
Theorem 2 
PriSens  provides unlinkability with respect to the adversary Aˆ. 
Proof 
Let us assume 𝒪𝒪pick provides the adversary ?ˆ?𝐴 with two tags 𝑇𝑇0,𝑇𝑇1 from the same group. These two tags 
go into the learning phase. ?ˆ?𝐴 transmits 𝑇𝑇0,𝑇𝑇1 to 𝒪𝒪flip which outputs the response 𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏. 
Now, to break unlinkability, the adversary ?ˆ?𝐴 has to tell the value of 𝑏𝑏. We assume that the adversary’s 
guess is right. In other words, the adversary can determine whether the response 𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏 is produced by 𝑇𝑇0 
or 𝑇𝑇1, given the learned responses from both the tags. The responses of a tag cannot be a signature of 
the tag because according to our protocol, a nonce on the tag side makes each response different from 
all the previous responses originated from the same tag. Therefore, we can say that the guess is right 
because the adversary knows the keys (the group key and the secret key) stored on these two tags. 
Without tampering the tags 𝑇𝑇0,𝑇𝑇1, the adversary has to determine the keys stored on these tags by just 
observing the cipher texts. But this contradicts with the semantic security of symmetric key 
cryptography. Therefore the adversary can break unlinkability with no better approach than random 
guessing. Thus it proves the unlinkability property of Definition 2. ■ 
8.3. Physical attack 
Under this attack, we consider that the adversary ?ˆ?𝐴 can compromise any tag with a probability of 1
𝑁𝑁
. 
Whenever a tag becomes compromised, the adversary learns all private information stored on the tag 
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗. Therefore, the adversary can now decrypt 𝑢𝑢 of each response 𝛽𝛽 originated from the other members 
of the group 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖. Thus, ?ˆ?𝐴 can learn the identifier that a tag is using to produce its response by 
decrypting the 𝑢𝑢. We discuss the after effect of this attack with an example and demonstrate how 
PriSens provides unlinkability even if the adversary realizes the identifiers used in the responses. 
We consider a group 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 of four tags 𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2,𝑇𝑇3, and 𝑇𝑇4. Suppose the adversary compromised the tag 𝑇𝑇3 
as shown in Fig. 4. Now the adversary learns the group key 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖, the tag secret key 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇3 and a set of 
identifiers 𝛺𝛺3 = {1,2,3,4}. From now on, the adversary can decrypt part of all the responses originated 
from 𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2, and 𝑇𝑇4 with the group key 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖. However, the adversary still cannot decrypt 𝑣𝑣 part of these 
responses since she does not possess the secret keys of these tags. With this learned information (𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  
and 𝛺𝛺3), the adversary tries to track the other tags of this group. Since the adversary can decrypt 𝑢𝑢 of 
each responses, she can learn the identifier underlying the cipher text 𝑢𝑢. In other words, she can 
discover which identifier has been used to produce a response. The arrow in Fig. 6 represents that the 
responses of the authentication sessions (after 𝑇𝑇3 is compromised) are transmitted from the tags 
(𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2,𝑇𝑇4) to the reader. The identifiers used in these responses are shown above the arrow. Each 
identifier is shown in plain text since the adversary can retrieve the identifier by decrypting 𝑢𝑢 of 𝛽𝛽 
using 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖. 
 
Fig. 6. After effect of a physical attack on PriSens, where 𝑇𝑇3 is compromised by the adversary. 
According to our protocol, even if the adversary comes to know about the identifier used in a 
response, she cannot conclude which of the potential tags is the sender of this response. In our 
example, the adversary discovers the identifier 2 is used two times, but she cannot be certain which of 
these tags (𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2,𝑇𝑇4) is the originator(s) of these responses. Though 𝑇𝑇3 shares the identifier 2 with only 
𝑇𝑇1 and 𝑇𝑇4, however, the adversary has no knowledge about the parties with whom 𝑇𝑇3 is sharing which 
of its identifiers. Even the adversary does not know how many of the identifiers of 𝛺𝛺3 are being shared. 
So, under this scenario, the anonymity set of the potential senders of a given response seems to be 3 
to the adversary. Therefore, when the adversary compromises one tag from the group of uncorrupted 
tags, PriSens forms an anonymity set of size 1 and another anonymity set of size (𝑛𝑛 − 1) from the 
group instead of anonymity sets of size 1 like the group based authentication  [34]. This noticeable 
partition improves the level of privacy provided by PriSens. Because, the remaining (𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛) tags of the 
system forms the other anonymity set which is same under both the protocols. Thus PriSens prevents 
adversary benefit from tracking by compromising a tag. 
We now consider the case of compromising multiple tags of the same group. In the above scenario, 
even if ?ˆ?𝐴 compromises either 𝑇𝑇1 or 𝑇𝑇4 after compromising 𝑇𝑇3, the adversary cannot be certain whether 
𝑇𝑇2 has identifier 2 in 𝛺𝛺2 or not. Therefore, the size of anonymity set is still 2, i.e., 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐, where is the 
number of compromised tags of the group. If ?ˆ?𝐴 compromises 𝑇𝑇2 instead of 𝑇𝑇1 or 𝑇𝑇4, the size of 
anonymity set is still 2 (i.e., 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐). Therefore, we conclude that the anonymity set, formed from a 
group that is under physical attack, is of size (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐), where 𝑛𝑛 is the group size and 𝑐𝑐 is the number of 
compromised tags of the given group. 
8.4. Tracking attack 
In tracking attack, an adversary tries to track a tag (𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗) over time. It succeeds if it is able to distinguish 
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 from other RFID tags over time. Under this attack, adversary repeatedly queries 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 with a value 
which yields a consistent reply. This consistent reply becomes a signature of 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗. Adversary can reuse 
the same random nonce 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 learned from any previous challenge-response. By incorporating 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 in the 
tag side, our protocol becomes secured against tracking as adversary cannot predict 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡. Consequently 
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 will reply a new output each time it is queried using a different random nonce and different 
identifier selected from the identifier pool assigned to tag 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗. Thus adversary fails to get any consistent 
reply from 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗. As a result it cannot follow 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 afterwards and the tracking attack is not successful. Hence 
our protocol proves to be secure against tracking attack. 
9. Evaluation 
Though our framework consists of two major components, the main privacy preservation is done by 
the PriSens component while identifying a tag via radio frequency channel. HSAC is able to preserve 
privacy by restricting unauthorized access given that HSAC follows a proper implementation of P-RBAC 
technique and privacy policies are properly defined. Therefore, it is more significant to evaluate the 
privacy achieved by the PriSens component. 
In this section, we measure the level of privacy achieved by PriSens as a function of the total number of 
compromised tags. We compare the performance of PriSens against the group based authentication 
protocol proposed in  [34] by Avoine et al. We consider two privacy metrics for the measurement of 
privacy. First, our privacy measurement technique is based on anonymity set like the privacy metric 
used by Avoine et al.  [38] and we name this metric “privacy level”. Second, we identify the amount of 
information disclosed by a scheme as another metric presented in  [37]. This metric is based on 
Shannon’s information theorem  [48] and we name this metric “information leakage”. 
9.1. Measurement of privacy based on anonymity set 
The level of privacy of an RFID system, achieved by a scheme, at a given time, is a function of the total 
number of compromised tags at that time. When some tags are compromised, the set of all tags are 
partitioned such that the adversary cannot distinguish the tags belong to the same partition, but she 
can distinguish the tags that belong to different partitions. So, these partitions become the anonymity 
sets of their members. The level of privacy based on anonymity set, ℘, can be measured as the average 
anonymity set size  [34].  
℘ = 1
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Where |𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖| denotes the size of partition 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and |𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖||𝑁𝑁|  is the probability that a randomly chosen tag 
belongs to partition 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 . 
According to PriSens, a similar kind of partitions is formed when tags become compromised. If 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is the 
number of compromised tags within group 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖, then the set of the tags within this group is partitioned 
into 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 anonymity sets of size 1 and another anonymity set of size (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖). If ℂ ={𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖is the total compromised tags within𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖} is the set of compromised groups, |ℂ| is the total number 
of compromised groups, and 𝐶𝐶 = ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖each𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖∈ℂ  is the total number of compromised tags, the level of 
privacy achieved by PriSens can be expressed as  
℘ = 1
𝑁𝑁2
((𝑛𝑛(𝜏𝜏 − |ℂ|))2 + � (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)2)
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) 
where 𝑁𝑁 = total number of tags in the system 
• 𝑛𝑛 = total number of tags within a group 
𝜏𝜏 = total number of groups in the system. 
9.2. Measurement of privacy based on information leakage 
We measure the information leakage in bits based on Shannon’s information theorem  [48]. If we have a 
group of tags of size 𝑆𝑆 and the adversary divides this group into two disjoint subgroups of size 𝑆𝑆/2, 
then 1 bit of information is disclosed out of 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2𝑆𝑆 bits. Extending this concept from two subgroups of 
equal size to two subgroups of different sizes, where 𝑆𝑆
𝑎𝑎
 tags are in one subgroup and the remaining tags 
are in another subgroup, we can measure the average amount of information disclosed in bits as 
follows  
𝐼𝐼 = 1
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2(𝑎𝑎) + 𝑎𝑎 − 1𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2( 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 1). 
In general, if the adversary splits 𝑁𝑁 tags of the system into 𝑘𝑘 disjoint partitions, then  
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Where |𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖| denotes the size of partition 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖. According to our protocol, if ℂ ={𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖is the total compromised tags within𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖} is the set of compromised groups, |ℂ| is the total number 
of compromised groups, and 𝐶𝐶 = ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖each𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖∈ℂ  is the total number of compromised tags, the amount of 
information leakage in bits can be expressed as  
𝐼𝐼 = (𝑛𝑛(𝜏𝜏 − |ℂ|)
𝑁𝑁
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2( 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛(𝜏𝜏 − |ℂ|))) + � (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(1𝑁𝑁 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2𝑁𝑁) + (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2( 𝑁𝑁(𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)))
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where, 𝑁𝑁, 𝑛𝑛, and 𝜏𝜏 bear the same meaning mentioned before. 
9.3. Experimental results 
We have compared both the protocols, PriSens and the group based authentication, using a Matlab 
simulation. The experiment results establish that the level of privacy provided by PriSens is higher than 
that of the group based authentication. Our comparison is based on the two metrics presented above, 
the level of privacy (based on anonymity set) and information leakage. We have come up with a 
conclusion same as  [37] that the information leakage describes the privacy threats better than the 
anonymity set. 
In our simulation, we have considered two systems with 𝑁𝑁 = 216, 𝜏𝜏 = 64 and 𝑁𝑁 = 220, 𝜏𝜏 = 64. Tags 
are selected to be compromised with a uniform random distribution. The number of compromised tags 
ranges from 0 to 160. We have run the simulation for 100 times and computed the average achieved 
by PriSens and the group based authentication as a function of the total number of compromised tags 
𝐶𝐶 (Fig. 7(a)–(b)). 
 
Fig. 7(a). (a) Level of privacy based on anonymity set, with 𝑁𝑁 = 216 and 𝜏𝜏 = 64. 
. 
 Fig. 7(b). (b) Level of privacy based on anonymity set, with 𝑁𝑁 = 220 and 𝜏𝜏 = 64. 
 
Fig. 7(c). (c) The amount of information leakage, with 𝑁𝑁 = 216 and 𝜏𝜏 = 64. 
. 
 Fig. 7(d). (d) The amount of information leakage, with 𝑁𝑁 = 220 and 𝜏𝜏 = 64. 
Fig. 7. Experimental results of PriSens against the group based authentication. 
The small increase in the level of privacy achieved by PriSens is visible when the total number of 
compromised tags becomes more than 30. During the simulation, we have also computed the average 
amount of information leakage 𝐼𝐼, for both the protocols, as a function of the total number of 
compromised tags (Fig. 7(c)–(d)). The plots depict that a significant amount of improvement in privacy 
protection is achieved by PriSens. With the increase in the total number of compromised tags 𝐶𝐶, the 
average amount of information disclosed by the group based authentication is quite higher than the 
information disclosed by PriSens. 
In Fig. 7(c) (𝑁𝑁 = 216), when 𝐶𝐶 becomes 160, the group based authentication discloses about 15 bits 
out of 16 bits of information, while PriSens discloses about 6 bits of information. The group based 
authentication discloses 56.25% more information than PriSens in a similar setup. 
Fig. 7(d) (𝑁𝑁 = 220) shows that the group based authentication reveals almost 19 bits out of 20 bits of 
information and PriSens reveals around 6 bits of information. This time the group based authentication 
discloses 65% more information than PriSens. Based on the simulation results, we can conclude that 
the information disclosed by the group based authentication increases with the size of the system; 
however, PriSens shows consistency in the information leakage in both the cases. Information leakage 
is a better metric to demonstrate the privacy threats in RFID systems than anonymity set. Though the 
improvement in ℘ provided by PriSens against the group based authentication is not significant, 
however, we can say that PriSens provides better privacy protection than the group based 
authentication, based on the results of the amount of information disclosed by these two protocols. 
10. Discussion 
While RFID technology can improve the overall quality of healthcare system, the potential benefits of 
RFID technology have been accompanied by threats of privacy violations  [49]. The use of RFID 
introduces a new set of risks: security risks are associated with the possible failure of the RFID system 
under various security attacks, i.e. tracking, eavesdropping, and denial of service, while the threat to 
privacy resides in the capabilities to permanently save and track information about individuals through 
temporal and spatial extension of data collection. Even though concerns about information privacy are 
not unique to the healthcare domain, health related information can be perceived as more personal 
and more sensitive. A recent report by the California HealthCare Foundation found that 67% of the 
national respondents worry about the privacy of their personal medical information  [50]. Due to the 
highly personal and sensitive nature of healthcare data, both healthcare providers and patients can be 
expected to resist further digitalization and data source sharing of personal health data until security 
and privacy protections are in place. The motivating example of RFID applications presented in this 
paper are examples of RFID based healthcare or such systems where user’s privacy is the most 
important issue. The goal of our proposed framework is to preserve privacy efficiently as well as 
provide basic security like confidentiality, unlinkability, and authentication. PriSens protocol is able to 
achieve all these goals since it discloses much less information than the existing protocols. HSAC 
component of our framework also helps in ensuring more privacy in RFID based healthcare systems by 
regulating user access to sensitive personal information using smart access control techniques. 
11. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a framework, PriSens-HSAC that provides increased privacy for RFID based 
healthcare systems. The PriSens component provides better privacy compared to the existing RFID 
authentication protocols while identifying an RFID tag in healthcare setting. The HSAC component 
restricts unauthorized access of patient’s private information by using P-RBAC mechanism. Though our 
major motivation behind this proposal is to enhance the privacy of users in an RFID based healthcare 
system, our proposed PriSens-HSAC framework also addresses all the security requirements. There are 
numbers of benefits of using our proposed framework. First, the use of our proposal will clearly 
provide more privacy and disclose less information if the RFID application is ever attacked by an 
adversary, which eventually will ensure more privacy for its users. Second, the PriSens component of 
the framework will work even if the tags are very cheap meaning even if they have less computational 
capability, which is ideal for mass deployment of RFID systems. Third, HSAC component of the 
framework will allow authorized users to access EMR linked with RFID data which in turn ensure more 
privacy for the users. Our evaluation also clearly illustrates that the adoption of this framework will 
allow RFID based healthcare systems to preserve user privacy. The widespread adoption of such 
privacy preserving framework for RFID systems will open doors for various assisted care, remote health 
monitoring, and elderly care applications. 
In PriSens-HSAC framework, one research investigation could be to investigate the performance and 
accuracy of the entire framework by utilizing it in various real scenarios for different user roles like: 
Physician, Emergency care provider, and Pharmacist. To better investigate the privacy preservation 
issue, one could also test the accuracy of the framework by simulating the system scenario under 
various attacks. One other research direction in case of PriSens-HSAC framework can be to investigate 
the privacy levels achieved for different types of service requests and different attacks. Another future 
research direction in the context of privacy preservation in RFID systems could be to study the privacy 
threats in RFID data publishing phase and show that traditional anonymization techniques are not 
applicable for RFID data due to its challenging properties: high-dimensional, sparse, and sequential. 
Future research can also be focused to adopt a newer privacy model like LKC-privacy that can 
overcome these challenges in the data publishing phase. Another future work can be in the direction of 
changing the domain of identifiers to be used by the tags after a certain time period. In order to 
increase privacy and to randomize tag’s output even more, new set of identifiers could be assigned 
after a certain period which will require changes in our proposed framework to address different 
challenges. 
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